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An old idea in economics holds that a more egalitarian income distribution may be beneficial for aggregate employment through its effect on the composition 
of consumer demand. High purchasing power in the hands of the lower classes 
generates large markets that foster industrialization and the emergence of a mass-
consumption society. In contrast, high inequality may generate a large reserve army 
of labor stuck in agriculture or marginalized in urban areas. As a result, high ex 
ante inequality in the distribution of productive resources can be an obstacle to 
economic development.
In this paper, we present a dual economy model with a modern (formal) sector 
and a subsistence (informal) sector in which income inequality becomes a crucial 
determinant of modern-sector employment. We focus on a novel mechanism largely 
neglected by the previous literature: the impact of income inequality on prices and 
mark-ups set by modern firms. The basic idea is that an unequal income distribu-
tion may induce some firms to set high prices and mark-ups and sell their prod-
ucts exclusively to rich consumers. Other firms set low prices, making their product 
affordable to the poor. We will call the latter firms “mass producers” and the former 
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Exclusive Goods and Formal-Sector Employment†
By Reto Foellmi and Josef Zweimüller*
We explore how the underemployment problem of less-developed 
economies is related to income inequality. Consumers have non-
homothetic preferences over differentiated products of formal-sector 
goods and thus inequality affects the composition of aggregate 
demand via the price-setting behavior of firms. We find that high 
inequality divides the formal sector into mass producers and exclusive 
producers (which serve only the rich); high inequality generates an 
equilibrium where many workers are crowded into the informal econ-
omy; and an increase in subsistence productivity raises the unskilled 
workers’ wages and boosts employment due to the higher purchasing 
power of poorer households. (JEL D31, D43, E24, E26, J24)
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firms “exclusive producers” (because they charge prices unaffordable to the poor 
and “exclude” them from the customer base). Because a more unequal society will 
generate a higher (lower) fraction of exclusive (mass) producers, and because exclu-
sive (mass) producers hire few (many) workers, a negative impact of inequality on 
formal-sector employment is established.
Empirical evidence is consistent with such a negative inequality-employment 
relationship. Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein (2007) find a robust correlation 
between income inequality and various measures of informal-sector activity in 
a cross section of countries and show that this relationship is robust to various 
measures of informality and/or inequality. J. Barkley Rosser, Marina V. Rosser, 
and Ehsan Ahmed (2000) use panel data from 16 transition economies and docu-
ment that increases in inequality are associated with larger shares of output in the 
informal economy. Diego Winkelried (2005) uses a panel of Mexican metropolitan 
areas and finds that informal sector activity is positively affected by the Gini coeffi-
cient. Moreover, a large middle class (as measured by the third and fourth quintiles 
of the income distribution) is strongly, negatively associated with the size of the 
informal sector.
For obvious reasons, our analysis is of particular relevance to developing econo-
mies where the formal sector is small, leaving the economy with a reserve army of 
labor trapped in subsistence. Arguably one of the most important obstacles for the 
development of a dynamic manufacturing sector is a weak education system and a 
lack of entrepreneurial talent. An additional major obstacle to entry are high direct 
or indirect entry costs that may be prohibitive even for promising projects. One 
important reason is the limited access to credit (see, e.g., Simeon Djankov, Caralee 
McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer 2007). Moreover, there is ample evidence that setting 
up a new business is often associated with extremely high costs (Hernando de Soto 
1989; James R. Tybout 2000). Government regulation, high fees and time-consum-
ing procedures can often make it costly to start up a new business (Djankov et al. 
2002). Additional entry costs may arise from corruption and bribes to overcome 
and/or speed up the start-up process of new business (see, e.g., Foellmi and Manuel 
Oechslin 2007).
To capture such major barriers to entry, high fixed costs and a limited supply of 
entrepreneurial skills are crucial ingredients of our model. We assume that there are 
skilled and unskilled workers. Skilled workers are rich and can afford the goods 
supplied by both mass and exclusive producers. Unskilled workers are poor and can 
afford only the subset of the goods supplied by mass producers. Moreover, skilled 
workers decide whether to set up and run a modern firm or to work in production 
at high wages. In equilibrium, they are fully employed and indifferent between the 
two activities. Unskilled workers either find employment in the modern sector or 
are otherwise trapped in subsistence. In equilibrium, the wages of unskilled work-
ers are governed by productivity in subsistence and unskilled workers are indif-
ferent regarding whether they work between working in the formal sector or in 
subsistence production.1
1 The assumption that workers are indifferent between subsistence and formal sector work is made for simplic-
ity. We could think of a factory-premium wage (as in Kevin M. Murphy, Shleifer, and Robert Vishny 1989) or 
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A situation with exclusive producers and mass producers is hard to generate 
in the standard monopolistic competition model, where consumers have homo-
thetic preferences and prices and mark-ups are invariant to market size. As a 
result, our analysis deviates from the standard model by assuming non-homothetic 
preferences. To generate the above price and employment effect, our specifica-
tion of preferences features demand functions with decreasing price elasticities. 
Decreasing price elasticities imply that rich consumers who are able to select a 
point lower down in the demand curve have a lower price elasticity, allowing firms 
to charge a higher mark-up. The simplest case that generates such a situation is that 
of quadratic preferences. Quadratic preferences feature linear individual demand 
curves (with potentially binding nonnegativity constraints) and provide us with a 
simple and tractable framework of analysis. Nevertheless, the quadratic specifica-
tion should be viewed as an example that, as discussed at the end of the paper, 
extends to more general specifications of preferences.
Understanding the role of non-homothetic preferences for aggregate outcomes 
is of more general importance. On the one hand, the standard assumption of homo-
thetic preferences is highly unrealistic from an empirical point of view. Previous 
empirical research on the shape of Engel curves has uniformly rejected the hypoth-
esis of unit income elasticities for all products.2 On the other hand, the aggregate 
implications of non-homothetic preferences are not well understood, as the repre-
sentative agent paradigm can no longer be applied. This is particularly relevant in 
the context of developing economies, where income differences between consumers 
are typically very large. A potentially interesting feature of non-homothetic prefer-
ences is variable mark-ups. As a result, incorporating non-homothetic preferences 
into a general-equilibrium framework highlights interesting interactions between 
inequality on the one side and mark-ups, real wages, the size distribution of modern 
firms, and the allocation of employment across sectors on the other side. Such inter-
relationships, while potentially important in practice, are ruled out by assumption in 
the standard framework with CES preferences.3
Our analysis yields three important results. First, sufficiently high inequality 
divides the modern sector into mass-consumption firms and exclusive firms. Such 
an asymmetric equilibrium arises even though all modern firms are assumed to be 
identical ex ante (i.e., have identical cost and demand curves). In equilibrium, firms 
are indifferent between selling only to the rich at high prices or selling to both the 
rich and the poor at lower prices. In other words, there are small markets, where 
producers take advantage of the rich’s high willingness to pay and set prices that the 
an efficiency wage (as in Partha Dasgupta and Debraj Ray 1987, or Jeremy I. Bulow and Lawrence H. Summers 
1986). Adding such assumptions would generate an equilibrium where unskilled workers are strictly better off when 
employed in the formal sector. Such assumptions would have an impact on the shape of the (effective) labor sup-
ply function. Because the main point of our analysis is on how inequality affects the product and labor demand of 
modern sector firms, the particular shape of the labor supply function is not essential.
2 For a recent summary of the state of research on Engel-curves, see Arthur Lewbel (2006).
3 In the second part of their seminal paper, Avinash K. Dixit and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1977) explore the implica-
tions of variable elasticities of substitution (VES). However, they abstain from introducing income inequality into 
their model. Our analysis shows that introducing heterogeneous consumers fundamentally changes the character of 
the general equilibrium.
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poor cannot afford, and there are mass markets, where producers set low prices and 
take advantage of a large market.
Second, an exogenous increase in inequality is associated with lower labor 
demand by the modern sector. The effect is driven by the composition of modern-
sector firms. When inequality is high, there are few mass producers and many exclu-
sive producers. When inequality is low, mass consumption is more prevalent, and 
the overall level of formal-sector employment is large. The reason is that, with high 
inequality, both mass producers and exclusive producers set higher prices and mark-
ups. As a result, for given wages, the aggregate demand for unskilled labor falls, and 
the fraction of poor households engaged in subsistence increases. This result holds 
true regardless of the size of the subsistence sector.
Third, an increase in subsistence productivity boosts wages and employment of 
unskilled workers. Higher subsistence productivity forces modern firms to pay higher 
unskilled wages, reducing aggregate inequality. Because of the reasons outlined in 
the previous paragraph, the extent of mass consumption and hence formal-sector 
employment increases. Moreover, an increase in subsistence productivity may not 
only increase the welfare of poor households but may also increase the welfare of 
the rich. Even though higher unskilled wages decrease the income of wealthy house-
holds, the rich benefit due to a larger menu of mass-consumption goods and their 
lower prices.
There is a small literature studying how the interaction of non-homothetic pref-
erences and income distribution affects the sectoral distribution of output and 
employment in the context of economic development. Kiminori Matsuyama (2002) 
studies a model where consumers have non-homothetic preferences and income 
inequality affects employment in dynamic sectors that generate technical progress 
via learning-by-doing. He is interested in the dynamic evolution of the economy, 
whereas our focus is on aggregate employment in a static context. Moreover, firms 
in the Matsuyama model operate on competitive product markets, whereas in our 
model firms exert market power and crucially affect employment via price setting. 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) study the effect of income inequality on mar-
ket size and manufacturing employment under non-homothetic preferences. Their 
focus is on the entry of firms operating with superior technologies. In their model, 
mark-ups and prices are taken as given. In contrast, our analysis focuses on a situa-
tion where entry is prohibited and income distribution effects work via endogenous 
prices and mark-ups.4
Winkelried (2005) presents a model where firms decide whether or not to enter 
the formal sector. In this decision, the size of the market (which is determined by the 
distribution of income across households) plays an important role. This is different 
from the present framework, where all informal-sector workers are trapped in sub-
sistence. Gilles Saint-Paul (2006) studies a monopolistic competition model with 
non-homothetic preferences and shows that non-homothetic preferences that feature 
4 Other papers that incorporate non-homothetic preferences into a general equilibrium framework are Josef 
Falkinger (1994), Chien-fu Chou and Gabriel Talmain (1996), Chol-Won Li (1996), Oded Galor and Omer Moav 
(2004), and Foellmi and Josef Zweimüller (2006a) in the context of economic growth and Harry Flam and Elhanan 
Helpman (1987), Matsuyama (2000), and Devashish Mitra and Vitor Trindade (2005) in the context of international 
trade.
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decreasing price elasticities of demand generate an ambiguous relationship between 
technical progress and the real wage. While the mechanism in the present paper is 
similar, Saint-Paul sticks to a representative agent framework and studies the impact 
of the factor-income distribution in the context of long-run growth. In contrast, our 
focus is on a developing economy and the interaction between price-setting behav-
ior and income inequality, which allows us to explore the effects of inequality on 
formal-sector employment.5
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we present our basic model and 
derive the households’ optimal consumption levels and the monopolists’ optimal 
prices and quantities. Section II characterizes an asymmetric equilibrium. Section III 
briefly presents the symmetric case. Section IV proofs the existence of equilibria. 
Section V addresses the question of our primary interest: the relationship between 
inequality and modern-sector employment. In Section VI, we discuss the robustness 
of our results with respect to the central assumptions, and Section VII concludes.
I.  A Model of Monopolistic Competition with Quadratic Preferences
A. Consumers
There is a population of heterogenous households with total mass 1. To keep the 
analysis transparent and simple, we consider a two-class society with β rich and 
1 − β poor households. Rich households are endowed with skilled labor (“entrepre-
neurial talent” or “human capital”). Poor households are endowed with unskilled 
labor. Subscripts p and r refer to poor (unskilled) households and rich (skilled) 
households. (The terms “unskilled” and “poor” and the terms “skilled” and “rich” 
will be used synonymously.) The aggregate stocks of skilled and unskilled labor are 
denoted by H and L, respectively. The typical poor household is therefore endowed 
with L/β units of unskilled labor and the typical rich household is endowed with 
H/(1 − β) units of skilled labor.6 The compensations of skilled and unskilled labor 
are denoted by r and w, respectively. Members of a poor household devote an 
(endogenous) fraction 1 − ℓ of their labor endowment to subsistence production 
and fraction ℓ to employment in the formal sector. Hence, they earn market income 
5 Our analysis can in principle also be applied to the context of developed economies to study labor-market 
equilibrium and the determination of factor prices in the “medium run” (Olivier J. Blanchard 1997; Robert M. 
Solow 2000). Instead of working in the informal economy, workers who do not get a job in the monopolistic 
sector are unemployed. Our analysis shows that the interaction of monopolistic firms’ price-setting behavior and 
the distribution of income across households give rise to an upward-sloping “price setting curve” (higher average 
prices are associated with lower employment and higher unemployment). Adding a story about wage setting would 
let us end up with a “medium-run” equilibrium. A related earlier literature addresses the issue of whether there 
may be unemployment when the labor market is competitive but the product market is not (see Oliver Hart 1982; 
Claude d’Aspremont, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, and Louis-André Gérard-Varet 1990; Pierre Dehez 1985; and 
Joaquim Silvestre 1990; for a survey of this literature, see Silvestre 1993). This literature points out that unemploy-
ment may occur when firms’ revenues are bounded and thus that labor demand may fall short of labor supply, even 
when the wage rate falls to zero. Such a possibility also arises in our model. While these papers have been concerned 
with the existence of unemployment equilibria in a representative-agent environment, our model focuses on the 
effect of heterogeneous consumers.
6 In a previous version of this paper, we allowed for a more flexible specification of the composition of income 
source. More precisely, it was assumed that poor households earned their income predominantly from unskilled 
labor but had also some income from the other production factor. Similarly, for rich households. The present analy-
sis can be extended to such a situation. We will come back to this issue in the discussion section below.
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wℓL/β. Members of a rich household work in the formal sector only and earn mar-
ket income rH/(1 − β).
All households have the same preferences over a continuum of differentiated 
products indexed by j. The various goods enter utility in a symmetric and separable 
way. It is assumed that the utility gain from consuming x units of a particular good j 
is given by v(x( j )) =  s​2 /2 −  (s − x( j ))​2 /2 with s being the saturation level.
Suppose N differentiated goods are supplied at prices  { p( j )}​j=0​N  . A typical rich 
household decides how to allocate income rH/(1 − β) across the various differenti-
ated goods and solves the problem
(1)   max   {​x​p ( j )​}​j=0​N   ∫​0
N
​ ​​s​
2 −  [s −  x​r ( j )]​2   __​
2
  dj s.t.  ∫​
0
N
​ ​p( j )  x​r ( j ) dj ≤ rH/(1 − β​),
which yields first order conditions
(2)   x​r ( j ) = s −  λ​r p( j ) if p( j ) ≤ s/​λ​r , and
  x​r ( j ) = 0 if p( j ) > s/​λ​r ,
where  λ​r is the marginal utility of income of a rich household.
A typical poor household has to decide how to allocate market income ℓ × wL/β 
across differentiated products and how to allocate the labor endowment between 
employment in the formal sector and subsistence, respectively. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that one unit of unskilled labor yields subsistence output γ and that one 
unit of the subsistence good yields one unit of utility. Hence, a poor household 
solves the problem
(3)   max   {​x​p ( j )​}​j=0​N  , ℓ​ ∫​0
N
​ ​​s​
2 −  [ s −  x​p ( j )]​2   __​
2
  dj + γ(1 − ℓ​)L/β 
 s.t.  ∫​
0
N
​ ​p( j )  x​p ( j ) dj ≤  y​p ≡ wℓL/β,
which yields first order conditions
(4)  x​p ( j ) = s −  λ​p p( j ) if p( j ) ≤ s/​λ​p , and
  x​p ( j ) = 0 if p( j ) > s/​λ​p ,
and
(5) ℓ = 1 if w > γ/​λ​p ,
 ℓ ∈ [0,1] if w = γ/​λ​p ,
 ℓ = 0 if w < γ/​λ​p ,
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where  λ​p is the marginal utility of income of a poor household. To have an interest-
ing problem, we assume γ/s < a(1 − α). If this condition did not hold, no poor 
household would work in the formal sector.7
B. Firms
Firms in the modern sector of the economy sell the differentiated products on 
monopolistically competitive output markets. Setting up and running a modern firm 
requires an input of F units of skilled labor. To produce output firms hire skilled 
and unskilled workers using the Leontief technology x( j ) = a min{αH( j ), (1 − α)
L( j )}, where x( j ) denotes the output of firm j and a > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1) are technol-
ogy parameters. With such technology, the unit cost of production is equal to c = 
a​−1 × (r/α + w/(1 − α)).
Which prices will firms set and which quantities will they supply? Consider a 
situation where N firms have entered the market and consumers make consumption 
choices that obey the above first order conditions (2) and (4). The level of market 
demand faced by firm j is simply the sum of individual demands. Using first order 
conditions for the respective types of consumers (noting that their λs are different), 
the market demand function of this firm, x( j, p( j )), is given by
(6)   0 if p( j ) ∈ [ s/λr , ∞),
 x( j, p( j )) = { (1 − β)​[ s −  λ​r p( j )]​ if p( j ) ∈ [ s/λp , s/λr),
  s −  [ β​λ​p + (1 − β)​λ​r ] p( j ) if p( j ) ∈ [ 0, s/λp) .
In other words, horizontal aggregation of individual households’ demand func-
tions yields a piecewise linear market demand function with kinks at the reservation 
price levels of rich and poor consumers s/​λ​r and s/​λ​p , respectively. When the price 
exceeds the reservation price of the rich, p( j ) ≥ s/​λ​r , market demand is zero. For 
prices between the reservation prices of rich and poor, p( j ) ∈ (s/​λ​p , s/​λ​r ], only rich 
consumers purchase and the market demand function is steep. For prices that fall 
short of the reservation price of the poor, p( j ) < s/​λ​p , both rich and poor consumers 
purchase and the market demand function is flat (Figure 1).
The monopolist supplying variety j is negligibly small relative to the aggregate 
economy. It takes as given the unit cost of production c (and hence factor prices w 
and r) and the consumers’ λs (which depend on prices of all other goods and on con-
sumers’ incomes). The firm chooses the price p( j ) that maximizes the profit function
  [ p( j ) − c] x( j, p( j ))
7 We could also assume that the rich have the option to work in the informal sector. Under the condition (s/F) 
×​ (​ϕ​2 /(1 − ϕ))(s − (s/(1 − β))(​ϕ​2 /(1 − ϕ))) > γ—where ϕ = aα​(1 − α)​L/(sF(αH − (1 − α)L)) and a, α, 
and F are technology parameters (see below)—we get r λ​r > w λ​p . This guarantees that, in the interesting equilib-
rium where the poor are indifferent between working in the formal and the informal sector, the rich are strictly better 
off when working in the formal sector.
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With the piecewise linear market demand function (6) there are two candidates for 
the monopoly price: the profit-maximizing price along the steep segment (where 
only the rich buy) or the profit-maximizing price along the flat segment (where all 
consumers buy).
Maximizing the profit function yields the respective monopoly prices along these 
two segments as
(7) p( j) = 
 {  p​E =  1 _​2  [ c + s/​λ​r ] along the steep segment, and   p​M =  1 _​
2
 [ c + s/(β​λ​p + (1 − β)​λ​r )] along the flat segment.
Equation (7) shows that prices and mark-ups depend on the consumers’ λs. In other 
words, price setting is determined by the distribution of income (and hence the dis-
tribution of λs). The larger the difference between  λ​p and  λ​r the larger will be the 
difference between  p​E and  p​M .
Notice how this model with linear demand curves differs from the standard CES 
framework. In the CES framework, prices are just a multiple of marginal cost with 
a mark-up that reflects the consumers’ elasticity of substitution between the various 
products. In the CES framework only equilibrium quantities, but not equilibrium 
prices, depend on consumers’ marginal utility of income. This is different in the 
present situation. The ratio of a monopolistic producer’s price over the unit costs of 
production also depends on the fundamental parameters of the model, not only pref-
erence, but also technology parameters and the distribution of income. The reason is 
that, with linear demand curves, the elasticity of demand falls along the demand curve.
c
XE XM MR
pE
pM
p( j)
X( j)
Demand 
Figure 1. Aggregate Demand and Monopolistic Pricing Decision
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II.  An Asymmetric Equilibrium
We now characterize an equilibrium where firms are indifferent between choos-
ing the monopoly point of the steep and the flat segment of the market demand 
curve. Firms that supply along the steep segment are “exclusive producers:” they 
charge a high price and sell only to the rich. (By setting a high price they “exclude” 
poor households from the market). Firms that supply along the flat segment are 
“mass producers.” Their prices are sufficiently low so that not only rich but also poor 
households can afford these goods.
A. Mass and Exclusive producers
Here, we solve for the general equilibrium of the model in the asymmetric case. 
(The symmetric equilibrium will be briefly discussed later on). We are free to choose 
a numeraire so let us set  p​M = 1. For further use, the following lemma is helpful.
LEMMA 1: denote, respectively, by (​x​E ,  p​E ) and (​x​M ,1) the equilibrium quanti-
ties and prices supplied along the steep and the flat segment of the market demand 
curve. Quantities and prices satisfy the following equations:
  x​E = (1 − β )s   p​E − c _​
2 p​E − c  
 and
  x​M = s  1 − c _​
2 − c  .
 the corresponding profits are  Π​E = (​p​E − c)​x​E and  Π​M = (1 − c)​x​M .
PROOF:
We express the λs in terms of  p​E and c and substitute the resulting expressions 
into the individual demands (4) and (2). This yields
(8)  x p E = 0,  x p M = s −  s _​β​ [  1 _​2 − c  −  1 − β​_2 p E − c  ],
  x r 
E = s − s[  1 _​2 p E − c  ]​p E ,  x r M = s − s[  1 _​2 p E − c  ],
where  x​i​E denotes the quantity purchased by a consumer of type i ∈ {r, p} when 
the firm chooses the exclusive strategy (= charges the high price) and  x​i​M denotes 
the respective quantities when the firm chooses the mass consumption strat-
egy (= charges the low price). The equilibrium output of exclusive producers is 
x​E = (1 − β)​x​r​E and of mass producers,  x​M = β​x​p​M + (1 − β)​x​r​M . Using the above 
expressions for  x​p​M  x​r​E , and  x​r​M yields the values for  x​E and  x​M .
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In an equilibrium with mass and exclusive producers both types of firms make 
the same profits  Π​M =  Π​E . Since firms are symmetric ex ante (i.e., every firm has 
the same demand- and cost-curves) they are indifferent between mass production 
and exclusion. Profits are  Π​M = (1 − c)​x​M for a mass producer and  Π​E = (​ p​E − c)​
x​E for an exclusive producer. Using Lemma 1 this equilibrium condition can be 
expressed in terms of the endogenous variables w and  p​E 
(9) s(1 − β​)   (​p​E − c)​2  _​
2 p​E − c  = s  
 (1 − c) ​2 
 _​
2 − c   .
It is straightforward to verify that equation (9) can be solved for the price of the 
exclusive good  p​E and expressed as a function of marginal costs c.8 For further 
use express the equilibrium condition (9) as  p​E = p(c) with p′(c) < 0. The negative 
relationship between  p​E and c is very intuitive. A reduction in the marginal cost c 
increases profits per unit of output by the same (absolute) amount both for exclusive 
producers and for mass producers. With prices unchanged, the larger market lets 
profits of mass producers increase more strongly than the profits of exclusive pro-
ducers. To restore equilibrium, a higher price  p​E is required to ensure equal profits 
of the two types of producers.
B. Firm Entry and the Allocation of skilled Labor
In the above discussion, we have assumed a given number of firms N. In this sec-
tion, we discuss how firm entry is determined. Since only skilled labor can set up 
and run a modern firm, we will see that the determination of firm entry closely inter-
acts with the allocation and compensation of skilled labor. Given the Leontief tech-
nology in the production of differentiated goods we have a fixed relation between 
the amount of skilled and unskilled labor,  H​y and  L​y ,
(10)    H​y  _​​L​y  =  
1 − α​_α​ ​ .
Using the fixed input ratio, it is straightforward to calculate, for a given amount of 
unskilled labor  L​y , the equilibrium allocation of skilled labor between production 
and firm creation. Denoted by  H​N is the amount of skilled labor engaged in setting 
up modern firms. As the fixed cost of firm creation equals F units of skilled labor, 
we have  H​N = FN. In equilibrium, skilled labor is fully employed, hence we have H =  H​N +  H​y . We now use expression (10) and make use of the fact that  L​y , the level 
of unskilled labor in production, is equal to the quantity of unskilled labor supplied 
ℓL. This allows us to express the number of entering firms N as a function of ℓ, the 
percentage of unskilled labor that finds employment in the formal sector
8 Equation (9) is a quadratic equation in  p​E . To see that  p​E is decreasing in c, it is straightforward to calculate the 
relevant root of  p​E as  p​E = p(c) = c + [​(1 − c) ​2 +  (1 − c) √​_​​1 − β​(2 − c) c ]/​[(1 − β)​(2 − c) ] .
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(11)  N(ℓ ) =  H −  
1 − α​_α​ ​ℓL  _ ​
F
  .
We note that ℓ is an endogenous variable to be determined below.
The latter two equations determine the allocation of skilled labor, but do not say 
anything about its compensation. In equilibrium, skilled workers have to be indif-
ferent between working in the production of final output or providing skills for firm 
creation. We can determine r, the compensation of skilled labor from the zero-profit 
condition for firm entry. In equilibrium, unexploited profit opportunities may not 
exist, hence the fixed entry cost, rF, may not fall short of the operating profits of an 
active (exclusive or mass) producer  Π​M =  Π​E . Using Lemma 1, we can express r as 
a function of unit production costs c as
(12)  r (c) =  s _​
F
   
 (1 − c) ​2 
 ​
2 − c  , with r ′(c) < 0.
A higher unit cost of production reduces profits, hence skilled labor becomes, ceteris 
paribus, less valuable.
Recall that with Leontief technology the unit cost of production is given by c 
=  a​−1 (r/α + w/(1 − α)). From this relation, we can express w, the compensation 
of unskilled labor, as a function of c
(13)  w(c) = (ac −  s _​αF    (1 − c) ​2  _​2 − c  )(1 − α), with w′(c) > 0.
C. the Market for unskilled Labor
We are now ready to address the variable of our main interest: the equilibrium 
level of employment in the formal sector. It turns out that the equilibrium conditions 
can be reduced to two equations in the two unknowns c and ℓ. We call the first of 
these two relations the “general-equilibrium demand relation for unskilled labor.” 
This relation is defined as follows.
DEFINITION 1: the general-equilibrium demand relation for unskilled labor is 
given by combinations of (c, ℓ ) along which (i) households obey first order condi-
tions (2) and (4) and exhaust their budget constraints; (ii) firms maximize operating 
profits, i.e., mass producing firms set price  p​M = 1 and sell output  x​M (c), and exclu-
sive firms set price  p​E = p(c) and sell quantity  x​E (c) (see Lemma 1); (iii) employ-
ment is ℓL i.e., any given amount of unskilled labor supplied finds a job in the formal 
sector; (iv) the free entry condition (11) is satisfied.
Notice that, while the above relation imposes full employment of a given amount 
of labor ℓL supplied by poor households to the formal sector, this condition does 
not require that the quantity ℓL is optimal from the perspective of poor households. 
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(This optimality requirement is captured by the second general-equilibrium relation 
in c and ℓ, see below.)
We proceed by deriving the general-equilibrium labor-demand relation. In an 
asymmetric equilibrium, there are mass producers with unskilled labor demand 
[ a(1 − α)​]​−1 x​M and exclusive producers with unskilled labor demand [a(1 − α)​]​−1 
×  x​E . Denoting by n the share of mass producers among all active firms, the aggregate 
demand for unskilled labor is given by [ a(1 − α)​]​−1 [ n x​M + (1 − n)​x​E ]N. Notice 
that  x​M and  x​E depend only on c, but not on ℓ, see Lemma 1, and that the equilib-
rium number of active firms N depends only on ℓ, but not on c, see equation (11).
It remains to be determined how n is related to c and ℓ. Clearly, the percentage of 
mass producers n is of crucial interest in the present context. Intuitively, an economy 
that concentrates on mass production will generate better employment opportunities 
for unskilled labor than an economy in which the formal sector focuses primarily 
on the satisfaction of wants of the rich. We can express the percentage of mass pro-
ducers n in terms of c and ℓ using the poor households’ budget constraint wℓL/β 
= nN x​p​M . Making use of Lemma 1 and equations (11) and (13) lets us write
(14)  n(c, ℓ ) =  w(c)​_​x​p​M (c)​​  
ℓL _​βN(ℓ )​ .
Notice that  n​ℓ​(c, ℓ ) ≡ ∂n(c, ℓ )/∂ℓ > 0. This is quite intuitive. When the unskilled 
households devote much of their labor force to employment in the formal sector, 
this will generate a higher formal-sector income and, hence, high demand for prod-
ucts in this sector. This induces many firms to become mass producers. We also 
have  n​c (c, ℓ ) ≡ ∂n(c, ℓ )/∂c > 0. There are two effects at work. On the one hand, 
higher production costs c are associated with higher wages from (13) and, thus, 
a higher aggregate income by poor households w(c)ℓL. This will lead to a higher 
prevalence of mass production. On the other hand, a higher c also implies that 
each producer will reduce their output (From Lemma 1, we have ∂​x​M /∂c < 0.) 
This lower output arises from lower sales to both rich and poor households, hence, 
∂​x​p​M /∂c < 0. This means that the poor will spread their income across a larger num-
ber of goods. In sum, an increase in c increases n, i.e., higher production costs are 
associated with more mass consumption.
We can now discuss how c and ℓ are related along the general-equilibrium 
labor-demand relation. It turns out convenient to define the excess demand func-
tion Ψ(c, ℓ ) given by the difference between unskilled labor demand  [a(1 − α)]​−1 
× [ n x​M + (1 − n)​x​E ]N and unskilled labor supply ℓL. In general equilibrium we have
(15)  Ψ(c, ℓ ) ≡  N(ℓ )​_​
a(1 − α)​ [ n(c, ℓ )  x​M (c) + (1 − n(c, ℓ ))​x​E (c)] − ℓL = 0.
The first term on the right-hand side of (15) nicely shows how the demand of 
formal-sector firms for unskilled labor comprises of three different components and 
how these components demand on c and ℓ: the number of active firms N(ℓ ) deter-
mined by (11); the percentage of mass producers among active firms n(c, ℓ ) given 
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by equation (14); and the labor demands of mass producers and exclusive producers, 
respectively, given by Lemma 1.
To characterize the curvature of the general-equilibrium labor-demand rela-
tion in (c, ℓ ) space we examine the derivatives of the function Ψ(c, ℓ ) with respect 
to c and ℓ. Note first that  Ψ​ℓ​(c, ℓ ) < 0.9 This says that an increase in labor sup-
ply ℓ is not fully matched by an increase in labor demand due to higher mar-
ket income of the poor wℓL. Notice further that the sign of [a(1 − α)]​Ψ​c (c, ℓ ) = N n​c [​x​M −  x​E ] + N[n∂​x​M /∂c + (1 − n)∂​x​E /∂c] is not clear a priori. On the one 
hand, an increase in c is associated with higher real incomes of poor households. 
The resulting increase in demand for differentiated products stimulates the incen-
tive for mass production. This purchasing power effect is captured by the term ​n​c [  x​M (c) −  x​E (c)] > 0. On the other hand, higher unit costs c induce firms to 
reduce employment and production. This familiar cost effect is captured by the term 
n∂​x​M /∂c + (1 − n)∂​x​E /∂c < 0.10
We turn to labor supply which yields a second condition in c and ℓ. The labor 
supply relation takes account of optimal labor supply choices by poor households. 
It is defined as follows.
DEFINITION 2: the general-equilibrium supply relation of unskilled labor are 
combinations of (c, ℓ ) along which (i) all poor households obey first order condi-
tions (4) and (5); and (ii) poor households purchase the quantity  x​p​M (c) from mass 
producers (see Lemma 1).
We have assumed that poor households allocate their labor supply optimally 
between the formal sector and subsistence. Hence, in equilibrium they need to be 
indifferent between working in the formal sector or working in subsistence produc-
tion. Optimal labor supply choices by poor households obey first order conditions 
(4) and (5). Combining the two conditions yields γ/w = s −  x​p​M . From (13) and 
Lemma 1, we know that, in general equilibrium, both w and  x​p​M depend only on c,
9 To see this, note that [a(1 − α)]​Ψ​ℓ​ (c, ℓ ) =  n​ℓ​ [  x​M −  x​E ]N + [ n x​M + (1 − n)​x​E ]∂N/∂ℓ − a(1 − α)L.
To sign the derivative, observe that  n​ℓ​ = n(1 − (ℓ/N)∂N/∂ℓ ) and N[ n x​M + (1 − n)​x​E ] < a(1 − α)L.
10 It is not straighforward to derive a meaningful condition under which the purchasing power effect dominates 
the cost effect and vice versa. We therefore undertook a large number of simulations to learn the slope of the gen-
eral equilibrium labor-demand relation. In all cases, we found that the purchasing power effect dominates the cost 
effect, so that  Ψ​c (c, ℓ ) > 0, and the general-equilibrium labor-demand relation is upward sloping in (c,ℓ ) space. 
The reason for the apparent dominance of the purchasing power effect is our assumption that income classes and 
income sources coincide. An increase in unskilled wages benefits the poor (and even harms the rich). In contrast, if 
both rich and poor households had the same relative endowments with skilled and unskilled labor (but the rich were 
better endowed with both factors), both types of households would be equally affected by a change in factor prices. 
In that case the purchasing power effect vanishes. This is discussed in a previous version of this paper (Foellmi and 
Zweimüller 2006b).
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but do not depend on ℓ. Hence, ℓ, the optimal fraction of unskilled labor supplied to 
the formal sector, is given by11
(16)  ℓ = 0 when γ/w(c) > s −  x​p​M (c)
 ℓ ∈ [ 0,1] when γ/w(c) = s −  x​p​M (c)
 ℓ = 1 when γ/w(c) < s −  x​p​M (c).
Condition (16) says that there is a cutoff level for the unskilled wage, w(​c​* ), defined 
as γ/w(​c​* ) = s −  x​p​M (​c​* ). The cutoff level is larger than zero (the wage rate (13) 
becomes zero at c > 0) and smaller than one (because γ/s < a(1 − α) by assump-
tion). When the unskilled wage falls short of this cut off, poor households remain in 
subsistence; and they prefer employment in the formal sector if the wage exceeds 
this critical level. Only when the wage is exactly equal to w(​c​* ) an interior solution 
where poor households devote their labor resources partly to the formal sector and 
partly the subsistence sector prevails.
III.  A Symmetric Equilibrium
Before we start to analyze the role of economic inequality for the size and 
employment of the formal sector, let us briefly address the situation of a sym-
metric equilibrium. Since inequality is endogenous, inter alia determined by fac-
tor prices, it could be that parameter values are such that low inequality arises 
in equilibrium in which the equilibrium outcome is symmetric, i.e., all firms are 
mass producers.
The market for skilled labor works just like it does in the asymmetric equilibrium, 
so equations (11), (12), and (13) continue to hold. By definition of a symmetric 
equilibrium, all formal-sector firms are mass producers and supply quantity  x​M (c) 
= (1 − c)/(2 − c) at price  p​M = 1. The general-equilibrium labor-demand relation 
is therefore given by
(17)  ℓL =  sN(ℓ )​_​
a(1 − α)​  1 − c _​2 − c  .
Notice that in the symmetric equilibrium the demand for labor is falling in c. This 
is because only the cost effect is at work that induces mass producers to supply less 
output. The purchasing power effect of a higher c is not at work in the symmetric 
case (since there are no exclusive firms who could become mass producers). Income 
distribution does not have an effect on demand for labor in the symmetric case 
because quadratic preferences are non-homothetic, but belong to the HARA class. 
11  Notice that the condition (16) is not a labor supply curve in the usual sense. Just like the general equilibrium 
labor demand curve defined above, the labor supply curve (16) requires that general quilibrium conditions hold. In 
particular, all households are required to supply their labor power optimally, and all mass producer firms sell the 
quantity  x​p​M (c) to poor households.
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The latter implies that the marginal propensity to consume is the same across all 
income classes as long as a product is consumed.
Just like in the asymmetric case, the second equilibrium relation in c and ℓ needs 
to consider optimal labor supply choices by poor households. The first order con-
ditions (4) and (5) still hold, and we have γ/w = s −  x​p​M . The poor households’ 
budget constraint requires  x​p​M (c, ℓ ) = w(c)ℓL/​(βN(ℓ ))​ in a symmetric equilibrium. 
As Lemma 1 applies only in the asymmetric case, but does not apply in a symmetric 
equilibrium, the equilibrium level of  x​p​M is no longer independent of ℓ. Hence, the 
optimal fraction of unskilled labor supplied to the formal sector is given by
(18)  ℓ = 0 when γ/w(c) > s
 ℓ ∈ [ 0, 1] when γ/w(c) = s − w(c)ℓL/(βN(ℓ ))
 ℓ = 1 when γ/w(c) < s − w(c)L/(βN(1)).
Equations (17) and (18) form the system of two equations in the two unknowns c 
and ℓ. Notice the difference in the general-equilibrium labor-supply curve between 
the symmetric and the asymmetric case. In a symmetric equilibrium, a higher ℓ lets 
poor households expand the consumption of differentiated goods mainly along the 
intensive margin, i.e., by increasing  x​p​M . Given the consumers’ utility function this 
implies decreasing marginal utility.12 Since the marginal utility from consuming less 
subsistence goods is constant, a higher wage w(c) is needed to induce poor households 
working in the formal sector. This implies an upward sloping general-equilibrium 
labor-supply curve. (Recall that w(c) is increasing in c from (13)). The situation is dif-
ferent in the asymmetric equilibrium where the increased income from a higher ℓ lets 
poor households expand their consumption along the extensive margin, i.e., they pur-
chase more differentiated goods, each at the same quantity  x​p​M (c). (Recall that, from 
Lemma 1, the quantity  x​p​M (c) is independent of ℓ.) Together with the constant marginal 
utility of the subsistence good this gives a flat general-equilibrium labor-supply curve.
IV.  Existence of Equilibrium
The previous sections characterized the properties of both an asymmetric and a sym-
metric equilibrium. This section will prove the existence of an equilibrium formally.
In Section III, we have characterized a symmetric equilibrium where all firms are 
mass producers and sell to all households. To check whether this is a Nash equilib-
rium, we consider a situation where all other firms charge a low price and sell to all 
consumers, and then we check whether a single firm has an incentive to deviate, i.e., 
set a high price and become an exclusive producer. It turns out that the exclusion 
strategy is worthwhile if the income disparities between rich and poor households are 
sufficiently large. This is very intuitive. Were rich and poor almost identical, the steep 
segment of the market demand curve would become irrelevant and all firms would 
prefer to benefit from the large market. However, when the income disparities are 
12  Since the total number of firms N(ℓ ) decreases when ℓ increases, poor households have to spread their con-
sumption over a more narrow range of goods which increases  x​p​M (and hence decreases marginal utility) even further.
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sufficiently large, it pays to exploit the higher willingness to pay by rich households 
and the exclusion strategy becomes a profitable option. The general equilibrium in a 
symmetric equilibrium is characterized by (17) and (18). It turns out useful to express 
the equilibrium level of marginal cost by the implicit expression
(19)   c​sym =  H − (2ζ + 1)​
1 − α​_α​ ​ ℓL  _ ​​​
H − (ζ + 1)​1 − α​_α​ ​ ℓL
  ,
where ζ = αaF/s and 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ 1. If ℓ ≤ 1, it is determined by γ/w(​c​sym ) = s − 
w(​c​sym )ℓL/(βN(ℓ )). Using (17) and (18), we see that  c​sym does not change if H and 
L change proportionally. The following proposition gives a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1: A symmetric equilibrium exists if and only if [(1 − β)(2 − ξ) + 
(1 − ξ)ξ  ]​2 /[ 4((1 − β)(2 − ξ) − (1 − ξ​)​2 )] < 1 with ξ =  c​sym .
PROOF:
See Appendix A.
If this condition is violated, there cannot exist a symmetric equilibrium because—
as shown in Appendix A—a symmetric equilibrium does not constitute a Nash equi-
librium for the monopolistic firms. The reverse statement, however, is not true. If the 
condition in Proposition 1 holds, a symmetric equilibrium exists, but there may be 
asymmetric equilibria as well.
Proposition 1 allows us to separate the two equilibrium regimes. Note that we 
may express the condition in the proposition in the terms of marginal costs (see 
Figure 2 below): If c <   cwhere [(1 − β)(2 −   c) +   c(1 −   c)​]​2 /[ 4((1 − β)(2 −   c) − 
(1 −   c)​2 )] = 1, a symmetric equilibrium cannot exist.
The condition always holds if ξ → 1, and is always violated if ξ → 0. It is shown in 
the proof of Proposition 1 that the left-hand side of the condition decreases in ξ. A fall 
in ξ implies that an asymmetric equilibrium becomes more likely. The reason is the fol-
lowing. A lower level of [ H − (2ζ + 1)((1 − α)/α)ℓ L]/[H − (ζ + 1)((1 − α)/α)ℓL ]
means, in equilibrium, higher production per firm, and allows an increase in con-
sumption for both groups. This increases markups as both types of consumers 
purchase at a less elastic point on their individual demand curves. However, since 
rich consumers are closer to their saturation point than the average consumer, 
this causes a disproportionate decrease in their demand elasticity. In other words, 
when the ratio in (19) is lower, markups increase more strongly when firms sell 
exclusively to the rich and increase less strongly when they sell on mass markets. As 
a result, the exclusion strategy becomes more attractive. Hence, the above condition 
in Proposition 1 is less likely to hold with higher inequality, that is when ζ is large. 
This confirms our claim that, when inequality is sufficiently high, an asymmetric 
outcome will prevail.
The following Proposition 2 states that at least one equilibrium (either symmetric 
or asymmetric) exists. This implies if no symmetric equilibrium exists, the remain-
ing equilibrium (be it single or multiple) must be asymmetric.
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VoL. 3 No. 1 259FoELLMi ANd ZWEiMüLLEr: ExCLusiVE goods ANd EMpLoyMENt
PROPOSITION 2:
 (i) An asymmetric equilibrium prevails when (c, ℓ ) combinations are such that 
n(c, ℓ ) < 1 in (14) and equations (15) and (16) hold.
 (ii)​ A symmetric equilibrium prevails when (c,ℓ ) combinations are such that 
n(c, ℓ ) ≥ 1 and equations (17) and (18) hold.
PROOF:
Consider first (c, ℓ ) combinations where n(c, ℓ ) < 1. We examine the 
axes intercepts in the (c, ℓ ) space of the general-equilibrium labor demand [ N(ℓ )/a(1 − α)][ n(c, ℓ )​x​M (c) + (1 − n(c, ℓ ))​x​E (c)] = Ψ(c, ℓ ) + ℓL. First, Ψ(c, 0) 
= [(H/F)/a(1 − α)]​x​E (c) > 0, hence ℓ fulfilling (15) must be greater than 0. 
Second, Ψ(1, ℓ ) + ℓL = − ℓL + ℓL = 0. We know that 0 <​​c​* < 1 in (16). Hence, 
1 > c ≥  c​* and 0 < ℓ ≤ 1 solve (15) and (16) simultaneously. For (c, ℓ ) combina-
tions where n(c, ℓ ) ≥ 1, the equilibrium is symmetric. For c ≥   c, GE labor demand 
simplifies to [ N(ℓ )/a(1 − α)]​x​M (c) (see Figure 2 below). The vertical axis inter-
cept is still given by (c, ℓ ) = (1, 0).
V.  Inequality and Formal-Sector Employment
We are now ready to address the question of our main interest. How does the 
extent of economic inequality affect the poor households’ employment opportuni-
ties in the formal sector? We will focus on an asymmetric equilibrium because this 
case captures the main features that characterize a typical developing country: high 
inequality and limited entry. However, to give the comprehensive picture we also 
capture the case where parameters are such that a symmetric equilibrium emerges.
It turns out convenient to rely on a graphical exposition where we draw the 
general-equilibrium demand and supply relations for unskilled labor in (c, ℓ ) space 
(Figure 2). Consider the labor demand relation. For sufficiently low values of c <   c
(see Proposition 1), unskilled wages w(c) are so low and inequality so high that the 
general equilibrium will be asymmetric and equilibrium relations (15) and (16) are 
relevant. The switch from an asymmetric to a symmetric equilibrium occurs at c =   c. 
When costs approach this critical level from below, the fraction of firms that become 
mass producers converges towards unity. When c ≥   c, we end up in an symmetric 
equilibrium where labor demand and supply relations (17) and (18) are relevant. 
The other critical level of c is  c​* , at which poor households are indifferent between 
working in the formal sector or remaining in subsistence (see discussion following 
equation (16). Obviously, the supply relation (16) is relevant only when   c >  c​* and 
the supply relation (18) is relevant for values of c ≥   c.
Figure 2 captures the case of an asymmetric equilibrium. The labor demand rela-
tion is assumed to be upward sloping in the asymmetric region c <   c.13 At c =   c
there is a kink and in the symmetric region c ≥   c the labor demand relation is down-
ward sloping. Panel A of Figure 2 is drawn for the case  c​* <   c so that an intersection 
13 We found upward sloping labor demand relations in all our simulations, see previous footnote 12.
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between the curves occurs in the flat part of the labor supply relation. Alternatively, 
panel B assumes that  c​* >   c so that an equilibrium where both the formal and the 
informal sector are active must be a symmetric one.
In what follows, we study the consequences of changes in inequality. In the con-
text of our model, there are two crucial parameters that determine the distribution 
of formal-sector income: productivity in subsistence γ, and the population size of 
the poor β. Since our analysis wants to capture changes in inequality in the context 
of a developing economy, we concentrate on an asymmetric outcome. Let us first 
consider the impact of higher productivity in subsistence γ (Figure 3). Notice that 
γ affects the labor supply relation (16), but does not show up in the labor demand 
relations (15) and (17). An increase in γ shifts the labor supply relation up. With a 
positively sloped labor demand relation as in Figure 3, this leads to both a higher c 
and higher ℓ. In other words, an improvement in subsistence productivity may foster 
formal-sector employment of unskilled workers and increase formal-sector wages 
of unskilled workers.
PROPOSITION 3:
 (i)​ An increase in subsistence productivity γ may lead to an increase of unskilled 
wages w and unskilled employment ℓL.
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 (ii) An increase in employment is associated with more mass producing firms 
nN and less exclusive firms (1 − n)N. the total number of active firms N 
decreases.
 (iii) An increase in γ may increase welfare of rich households.
PROOF:
Part (i) of the proposition states that the higher wages associated with an 
increase in γ may lead to an increase in employment of formal-sector firms. The 
reason is that the increased purchasing power of poor households induces many 
exclusive producers to become mass producers. These firms lower their prices to 
levels that poor households can afford and hire more (skilled and unskilled) work-
ers to satisfy the increased demand for their products. Working against this, the 
higher marginal costs (through wages) reduce the levels of employment of both 
mass and exclusive producers. However, when the former purchasing power effect 
dominates the latter cost effect (which is equivalent for the general-equilibrium 
labor-demand relation to have a positive slope) more unskilled workers find 
employment in the formal sector.14
Notice that the result in part (i) of the proposition is prima facie surprising. The 
utility functions in (1) and (3) assume a constant marginal utility for the subsis-
tence good whereas marginal utilities are decreasing for differentiated products. 
Hence, one would expect more economic activity in the subsistence sector when 
subsistence productivity increases (while productivity in the modern sector remains 
unchanged). Proposition 1 states the opposite outcome is possible and simulations 
show that such an outcome is very likely. In sum, purchasing power effects arising 
from non-homothetic preferences over differentiated products may be strong as the 
associated changes in price elasticities lead to changes in market sizes, equilibrium 
prices, and markups triggering employment effects that may be larger than the cost 
effects of higher wages for unskilled labor in the formal sector.
Part (ii) of the proposition says that the increase in unskilled employment is 
associated with a higher prevalence of mass consumption, but less entry of firms, 
see equation (11). In other words, the lower inequality in society associated with 
a higher γ lowers entry, but leads to a concentration of output in mass production.
Finally, part (iii) of the proposition states that not only poor households but also 
rich households may benefit from lower inequality. This is surprising as higher 
unskilled wages are associated with lower wages for skilled workers and hence a 
reduction in their income. However, rich households benefit from the low prices 
associated with the concentration on mass consumption. This effect may overcom-
pensate rich households for the lower production variety due to less firm entry.15
14  Simulations show that a positive slope of the general-equilibrium labor-demand relation is the likely case 
in an asymmetric equilibrium. In simulations, we were unable to find a single parameter constellation where this 
relation is downward sloping. Hence, the statement Proposition 1 does not hold just locally, but it is the relevant 
outcome in the context of the present framework.
15  To see this, consider the following parameter constellation H = L = F = 1, a = 2, α = β = 0.5, and s = 4. 
With γ > 0.48 welfare of rich households increases when γ rises. 
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Let us next examine a change in the population share of the poor β (Figure 4). 
The parameter β shows up both in the labor demand relation via its effect on the 
percentage mass producers n and the output of exclusive producers  x​E (see equa-
tion (14) and Lemma 1. The labor supply relation is affected by β via consumption 
level of the poor  x​p​M . It can be shown that an increase in β shifts the labor demand 
relation to the left and shift the labor supply relation upwards.
LEMMA 2: A higher β lowers employment for given c, i.e., it shifts the labor demand 
schedule to the left.
PROOF:
See Appendix B.
PROPOSITION 4: A higher extent of inequality due to a higher population share of 
poor households β tends to reduce employment of unskilled workers ℓ and leads to 
more firm entry N, but less mass production nN.
The proposition states that there is a negative relationship between economic 
inequality and formal-sector employment when inequality is generated by a 
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Figure 4. Rise in β
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change in the second distribution parameter of the model, the group share of the 
poor β. Recall that formal-sector income of a poor household is wℓL/β, and the 
income of a rich household is rH/(1 − β ). Hence, a higher β increases inequal-
ity both directly via population shares and indirectly via relative incomes.16 
Inspection of the labor demand relation (15) shows that an increase in β generates 
two effects. The first effect works through the reduction in the income of poor house-
holds when β rises. Consequently, less goods are sold to the poor, i.e., ∂n/∂β < 0 as 
follows from the proof of Lemma 2. The second effect works via the effect of β on 
prices and market sizes of exclusive goods. A higher β implies that there are fewer 
rich households which per se tends to reduce output and employment of exclusive 
producers. However, a higher β also increases the incomes of rich households which 
works in the opposite direction. Hence, the direction of the second effect is a priori 
unclear. However, the overall effect of an increase in β is to lower employment of 
unskilled labor. To see this, note that for a given c and ℓ (and hence a given w and 
given r), there is no direct effect on incomes of the poor and the rich as a group, wℓL 
and rH. With less mass producers the rich spend a larger fraction of their income on 
exclusive goods and this reallocation of expenditures reduces overall employment. 
The reason is that the higher prices (but identical labor requirements) of exclusive 
goods imply that a given amount of expenditures spent on exclusive goods generates 
lower labor demand than the same amount spent on mass products. Hence the labor 
demand relation shifts to the left.
The general-equilibrium labor-supply relation shifts up when β rises. Note that we 
have ∂​x​p​M /∂β > 0. A larger β raises, in equilibrium, the price ratio between exclu-
sive and mass products. Hence, markups on all products must rise due to (A3). 
Higher markups are only compatible with higher quantities in equilibrium, because 
the elasticity of demand decreases in consumption. To keep workers indifferent 
between working in subsistence and working in the formal sector a higher wage w(c) 
(and hence higher marginal cost c) is needed. Since all our simulations rendered an 
upward sloping labor demand, the net effect on employment is unclear (Figure 4). 
However, we were unable to find a parameter constellation where employment has 
risen after β had increased.
Finally, the effects of higher inequality on industry structure nN and firm entry N 
are very similar irrespective of whether higher inequality is generated from a higher 
β or from a lower γ. As long as the labor demand is upward sloping, in both cases a 
more unequal society concentrates its resources less in mass production and gener-
ates more overall firm entry from which only the rich benefit.
The above discussion has concentrated on an asymmetric equilibrium, which is 
the case of our main interest. In the less interesting situation of a symmetric equi-
librium, increases in inequality (due to a higher β and/or a lower γ) leave the labor 
demand relation unaffected (see equation (17)) and shift the labor supply relation 
down. Hence, in equilibrium, more inequality is associated with higher formal-sec-
tor employment, because lower unskilled wages induces firms (all of them are mass 
producers) to hire more workers.
16  The Lorenz curve is piecewise linear with population shares β and 1 − β and income shares wℓL/Y and 
rH/Y where aggregate income is Y = wℓL + rH.
264 AMEriCAN ECoNoMiC JourNAL: MACroECoNoMiCs JANuAry 2011
VI.  How General Are Our Results?
In this paper, we have presented a model where consumers have non-homothetic 
preferences, and where the distribution of income plays a central role for aggre-
gate employment. Our model has started out from simplifying assumptions. Let 
us briefly discuss the robustness of our results with respect to these assumptions.
preferences.—In our model, we have assumed a quadratic subutility function. 
We used the quadratic specification because it keeps the analysis simple and yields 
closed form solutions. The quadratic subutility function has two crucial properties. 
First, the marginal utility from consuming the first unit is finite, v′(0) = s < ∞. 
This is a necessary condition for an equilibrium where poor consumers do not 
want to afford all goods (i.e., the nonnegativity constraint may become binding). 
Second, the quadratic specification implies a linear demand curve of a particular 
consumer and a price elasticity of demand that decreases in consumed quantity. 
Denoting by η(c) the price elasticity of demand, we have η(c) =  (s − c) /c, which 
is decreasing in c.17
Our analysis extends in a straightforward way to the subclass of hyperbolic abso-
lute risk aversion (HARA) preferences that feature v′(0) < ∞. HARA preferences 
with this property also feature decreasing price elasticities along individual demand 
curves. Provided that this elasticity falls below unity at a finite c, equilibria with 
informal-sector employment are possible under appropriate parameter values. We 
elaborate this in greater detail in Appendix C. Going beyond HARA, things become 
more complicated because the distribution of income affects consumption along 
not only the extensive margin (how many consumers can purchase a certain good) 
but also the intensive margin. As Engel-curves are no longer linear, market demand 
curves depend on the distribution of income, even in symmetric equilibria.18
While our analysis relied on non-homothetic preferences, our particular specifi-
cation of non-homotheticities differs from most previous papers. In our framework, 
non-homotheticities operate entirely via the demand functions for differentiated prod-
ucts of the formal sector. These demand functions feature decreasing price elasticities 
and finite reservation prices, thus generating interesting interactions between income 
inequality on the one side and price, markups, and employment on the other side. 
In this sense, our model highlights a mechanism that has been largely neglected so 
far. Our specification differs from much of the previous literature that has assumed 
strong non-homotheticities in the subsistence (“elementary”) good. Adopting a simi-
lar assumption here would reinforce our results. Due to such non-homotheticities, any 
rise in formal-sector incomes (through an increase in a and/or a decrease in F ) would 
17  Note that the properties of a quadratic subutility function are quite different from those of the standard Dixit-
Stiglitz formulation. In that case, v ′(0) = ∞, so even the poorest consumers purchase all goods that are supplied 
(albeit in tiny amounts), and the elasticity of demand η(c) is the same for all consumers, i.e., it does not depend on 
consumed quantities.
18  Foellmi and Zweimüller (2004) analyze the impact of inequality on mark-ups in the context of a symmetric 
equilibrium. It turns out that the curvature of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, − v ′′(c)/v ′(c), determines 
whether higher inequality in the size distribution of income increases or decreases the mark-up.
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lead to an even stronger shift of demand towards differentiated products and away 
from subsistence.
technology.—We assumed that there is no substitution possible between skilled 
and unskilled workers in the formal sector. However, the result that purchasing 
power effects may dominate cost effects still holds true if we allow for substitution 
between the two types of labor. Interestingly, in the other polar case, with perfect 
substitution, the same effects are present: as long as unskilled labor is cheaper (per 
efficiency unit) than skilled labor, only the unskilled are employed in the formal 
sector. A small increase in unskilled wages will not change this allocation and will 
leave the number of firms unchanged, but it may increase employment due to the 
purchasing power effect (for an analysis of this case with a more general production 
function, see Foellmi and Zweimüller 2006b).
For intermediate degrees of the elasticity of substitution the cost effect of higher 
low-skilled wages presumably becomes stronger. Compared to the Leontief case, 
labor demand falls more strongly when marginal costs c and hence wages w(c) 
increase. Firms will replace unskilled by skilled workers so that an upward-sloping 
labor demand relation, while still possible, becomes less likely.19
More general distributions.—A simplifying assumption of our analysis was that 
there are only two types of consumers: the rich and the poor. How would the analy-
sis change by allowing for arbitrarily many groups? To get the intuition of how the 
analysis extends to many groups, consider the case of two groups of unskilled work-
ers so there are three groups: the rich, the poor, and the middle class. A candidate 
for a general equilibrium would be a situation where some firms sell only to the 
rich, other firms sell to the rich and the middle class and a final group of firms sells 
to all consumers. Whether or not such an equilibrium arises depends on how differ-
ent the various groups are. When the rich, the middle class, and the poor differ only 
slightly, a symmetric equilibrium will arise. When the rich and the middle class are 
very similar, there will be a situation where the poor but not the middle class are 
excluded from some markets. When the poor and the middle class are very similar, 
the poor and the middle class are excluded from the same markets, and so on. It is 
obvious that this line of reasoning can be extended to the general case with x differ-
ent groups of households. The equilibrium will be characterized by z ≤ x different 
types of firms, where z is weakly smaller than x, reflecting the fact that the market 
equilibrium merges very similar groups. Furthermore, a redistribution of income 
from richer to poorer households has effects analogous to the redistribution dis-
cussed in the two-group economy, provided that the redistribution occurs between 
groups that are sufficiently different.
Regarding the labor supply, the picture would also look different. When there are 
many types of low-skilled workers, the labor supply curve would become smooth, 
generating a critical group that is indifferent between subsistence and formal-sector 
19  We performed simulations for a Cobb-Douglas technology in the formal sector. When the income share of the 
high-skilled in the formal sector is sufficiently low, the general-equilibrium demand curve is still upward sloping.
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work. All workers poorer than this critical group remain in subsistence, whereas all 
workers richer than this critical group take a job in the formal sector.
theoretical predictions and Empirical Evidence.—Our model has several dis-
tinctive implications about relative prices, markups, and firm sizes. One empiri-
cally testable prediction is that mark-ups are higher in more unequal economies. 
We are not aware of any systematic evidence on the determinants of mark-ups in 
developing economies. For developed economies, however, Chris Edmond and 
Laura Veldkamp (2009) do indeed find a positive correlation between earnings 
inequality and markups. Kalina Manova and Zhiwei Zhang (2009), using cross-
country data, show that firms set higher markups in richer markets. This is consis-
tent with the prediction of our model that prices and mark-ups vary systematically 
with the income level of consumers. A further prediction of our model is that the 
size distribution of firms mirror the extent of inequality in the size distribution of 
endowments (such as land and human capital). Empirical evidence from develop-
ing countries suggests that the size distribution of firms is indeed very unequal 
and polarized in poor countries, where inequality is typically very high (Tybout 
2000). (See, e.g., Leo Sleuwaegen and Micheline Goedhuys 2002, for an empiri-
cal analysis of the firm size distribution in Côte d’Ivoire, a country with extremely 
high inequality). While the firm-size distribution is affected by many different 
channels, we think it is worthwhile to explore the role of purchasing power and 
the size of consumer markets.
VII.  Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the impact of income inequality on formal-sector 
employment in a less developed economy. Our analysis provides a theoretical expla-
nation for the old argument that a more egalitarian distribution of income, by generat-
ing purchasing power for the lower classes, may enhance employment opportunities 
and help to overcome the underemployment problem. In contrast to the previous 
literature, we emphasize a demand channel through which income inequality affects 
the price-setting behavior and employment decisions of monopolistic firms. We study 
a dual-economy framework where consumers have non-homothetic preferences over 
the goods produced in the modern sector. Combining these preferences with the 
standard monopolistic competition framework allows us to highlight a potentially 
important channel through which inequality may affect aggregate employment. In 
particular, we have shown that in an unequal society, there are “exclusive firms,” that 
set high prices (and mark-ups) and sell only to the rich, and “mass producers,” which 
set low prices and serve the entire customer base. By generating more mass produc-
tion, a more egalitarian society is able to absorb a larger fraction of employment and 
reduce the reserve army of labor trapped in subsistence.
This adverse effect of inequality on formal-sector employment works via the 
changing composition of firms. Higher inequality generates increased incentives 
to exploit the high willingness to pay among the rich consumers, which shifts the 
composition of firms away from being mass producers toward being small, exclu-
sive firms. The decrease in employment by mass producers is not fully offset by the 
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higher entry and employment of exclusive producers. We have also shown that an 
increase in subsistence productivity boosts formal-sector wages and the employ-
ment of unskilled workers. Higher wages in the formal sector generate purchasing 
power effects that increase mass production. The purchasing power effect (higher 
employment due to more mass production) dominates the familiar cost effect (lower 
employment due to higher production costs). The increase in unskilled wages, while 
reducing the incomes of the rich, may nevertheless improve their welfare due to 
higher production and lower prices of goods in the formal sector.
While our analysis relied on the assumption of non-homothetic preferences, 
the way in which such preferences are adopted in the present paper differs sub-
stantially from most previous papers that have relied on an explanation based on 
 non-homothetic preferences. The specification of non-homothetic preferences in the 
existing literature typically relies on income elasticities below unity in the subsis-
tence sector and income elasticities above unity in the formal sector. This is different 
in the present framework. Under our specification, a uniform increase in income, for 
example, through a joint increase in productivity a and decrease in fixed costs F to 
leave aF unaffected, does not change the sectoral composition as long as relative 
prices remain unchanged. In contrast, non-homotheticities work entirely via the 
demand functions for differentiated products of the formal sector. These demand 
functions feature decreasing price elasticities and finite reservation prices, thus gen-
erating interesting interactions between income inequality on the one side and price, 
markups, and employment on the other side. In this sense, our model highlights a 
mechanism that has been largely neglected so far.
Our model could be extended in various directions. First, our model is static, 
and it may be worthwhile to extend the analysis to a dynamic context. Allowing for 
innovation decisions brings interesting new elements into the picture. With non-
homothetic preferences, distribution will affect the choice of whether to introduce 
new products or to search for more efficient production processes. A second poten-
tially interesting extension concerns international trade. Our model is closed, and 
opening it up for international trade would enable the exploration of the interaction 
between increasing returns and economic inequality as a determinant of trade flows. 
Inter alia, this may provide a rationale for why terms of trade may be affected by 
demand considerations (such as the relative size of home markets) and income dis-
tribution. A final interesting extension concerns the medium-run equilibrium. While 
our analysis provides a much richer framework to incorporate the price-setting 
behavior of firms, wage-setting behavior was treated as a black-box. Incorporating 
wage-setting using more detailed assumptions on labor-market institutions would 
be potentially interesting for studying the interaction of product market and labor 
regulations for unemployment in the medium run.
Mathematical Appendix
A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
In a symmetric equilibrium, we must have  Π​M ≥  Π​E so that no firm has an incen-
tive to deviate and adopt the exclusion strategy. In asymmetric equilibria, mass 
 consumption producers and exclusive producers must earn the same profit  Π​M =  Π​E . 
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A situation where  Π​M <  Π​E cannot be an equilibrium: no firm would sell to the 
poor, which would leave them with idle purchasing power and very high willing-
ness to pay for some goods. Let us now find a condition under which no firm has 
an incentive to sell exclusively to the rich. For a given wage level w, we evaluate 
equilibrium profits in a symmetric equilibrium, and we denote these profits by  ˜ Π​E 
and  ˜ Π​M . To derive an expression for  ˜ Π​E note that  λ​r = s −  x​r​M ,  p​M is the numeraire. 
To determine  x​r​M , we use the budget constraint of the rich in a symmetric equilibrium: 
N x​r​M =  Π​M H/F. Hence,  x​r​M = s [1 − c] ​2 /​[2 − c] . We get the critical profits levels 
 ˜ Π​E and  ˜ Π​M in terms of c and exogenous parameters
(20)   ˜ Π​E =  s _​
4
  
[(1 − β)(2 − c) + c(1 − c)​]​2 (1 − c) ​2 
   __​​[(1 − β)(2 − c) − (1 − c )​2 ](2 − c)​ ​ , and  ˜ Π​M = s  
(1 − c )​2 
 _​
2 − c  .
The symmetric outcome is an equilibrium if, starting from a situation where all firms 
charge a price that attracts the whole customer base, no single firm has an incentive 
to deviate and adopt the exclusive good strategy. In other words, the inequality 
 ˜ Π​E <  ˜ Π​M must hold strictly. Using equations (20), we get
(21)    ˜ Π​E  _​​˜  Π​M  =  
1 _​
4
  
[(1 − β)(2 − c) + c(1 − c)​]​2 
   __​​(1 − β)(2 − c) − (1 − c )​2   < 1.
The left-hand side of (21) is decreasing in c. We inspect the derivative
   ​∂​_​∂c   1 _​4   
[(1 − β)(2 − c) + c(1 − c)​]​2 
   _​​​(1 − β)(2 − c) − (1 − c )​2   
 =   ​1 _​
4
  
[(1 − β)(2 − c) − (1 − c )​2 + (1 − c)][− 2(1 − c )​3 + 2β(1 − β) − [6 − β(5 + β)]c + 3(1 − β)​c​2 ]​​​​____[(1 − β)(2 − c) − (1 − c )​2 ]​2   
 <  0.
Recall that (1 − β)(2 − c) >  (1 − c) ​2 , this implies the second term in brackets 
of the nominator is increasing in β. At β = 1, the second term in brackets equals 
− 2 (1 − c) ​3 < 0, which confirms the negative sign of the derivative. Further, 
LHs(c = 1) = (1 − β)/4 < 1 and LHs(c = 0) = (1 − β​)​2 /​(1 − 2β)​ > 1. Hence, 
there exists a unique level of marginal costs   c with LHs(​ c) = 1. If the equilibrium 
marginal cost  c​sym is larger than   c, a symmetric equilibrium exists. To derive a con-
dition for existence of the symmetric equilibrium in terms of the parameters, we 
insert the equilibrium marginal costs into (21). From (19)  c​sym = [H − (2ζ + 1) × ((1 − α)/α)ℓL]/[H − (ζ + 1)((1 − α)/α)ℓL], we get a sufficient condition for 
the existence of a symmetric equilibrium
(22)   1 _​
4
  
[(1 − β)(2 − ξ) + ξ(1 − ξ)​]​2 
   _​​​(1 − β)(2 − ξ) − (1 − ξ​)​2   < 1 with ξ ≡  
H − (2ζ + 1)  1 − α​_α​ ​ ℓL  _ ​​
H − (ζ + 1)  1 − α​_α​ ​ ℓL
  .
VoL. 3 No. 1 269FoELLMi ANd ZWEiMüLLEr: ExCLusiVE goods ANd EMpLoyMENt
B. PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
We must show that ∂Ψ(c, ℓ )/∂β < 0.
  ∂ Ψ​_∂β​​ =  N _​a(1 − α)​[​∂n _​∂β​ (​x​M −  x​E ) +  ∂​x​E  _​∂β​].
The expression in square brackets is negative if ∂​x​p​M /∂β < 0 (which implies ∂n/∂β < 0, see equation (14)) and ∂​x​E /∂β < 0.
To show that ∂n/∂β < 0 ≡ ( N(ℓ )/a(1 − α))[n(c, ℓ )​x​M (c) + (1 − n(c, ℓ ))
× ​x​E (c)] − ℓL
  
∂​x​p​M (β)​_∂β​ ​ =  s _​​β​2    
2 _​
2 p​E − c  [​​p​E − 1 _​2 − c  −  β(1 − β)​_2 p​E − c   ∂​p​E  _​∂β​].
Total differentiation of (9) gives the partial derivative of  p​E with respect to β,
  
∂​p​E 
 _​∂β​ =  1 _​2   1 ​1 − β​  
 p​E − c
 _​​p​E   (2 p​E − c)
  
∂​x​p​M (β )​_∂β​ ​ =  ​s _​​β​2    
2 _​
2 p​E − c  [​​p​E − 1 _​2 − c  −  β​_​2    p​E − c ​​p​E   ]
 =  ​s _​​β​2    
2(​p​E − 1)​p​E − β(​p​E − c)(2 − c)​​​​__(2 p​E − c)(2 − c)​ ​.
The nominator ℵ is increasing in β. To show this, we calculate its derivative
  ∂ℵ​_∂β ​ =   ​p​
E − c
 _​
1 − β​  
2(2 p​E − c) − (2 p​E − c)(1 + β​  2 − c _​c  )/​p​E − (1 − β​)(2 − c)
     __ _​​​​(2 p​E − c)(2 − c)​
 =  ​​p​E − c _​
1 − β​  
2 p​E − c + 2( p​E − 1) − (2 p​E − c)/​p​E + βc(2 − c)/(2 p​E )​​​____​​(2 p​E − c)(2 − c)​  > 0.
This implies that for all ℵ(β ) = 2(​p​E − 1)​p​E − β(​p​E − c)(2 − c) > ℵ(0) = 0. We 
conclude that ∂​x​p​M (β )/∂β > 0 for β > 0.
Finally, we show that ∂​x​E /∂β < 0. Note that  x​E = (1 − β)​x​r​E = (1 − β)×​s[(  p​E − c)/(2 p​E − c)]
  1 _​s   ∂​x​
E  _​∂β​ = −  
 p​E − c
 _​
2 p​E − c  +  
c(1 − β)​_​​​(2 p​E − c) ​2    
∂​p​E 
 _​∂β​
 = −   p​E − c _​
2 p​E − c  +  
1 _​
2
  c ​
2 p​E − c   
 p​E − c
 _​​p​E   
 = −  1 _​
2
  
 p​E − c
 _​​p​E   < 0.
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C. MORE GENERAL PREFERENCES
We show the following: With HARA preferences and v′(0) finite, more inequality 
raises markups in a unique asymmetric equilibrium.
When preferences are HARA, v(·) is given by v′(c) = (c/σ + s )​−σ​ with s > 0 
and σ ∈ ℜ. Note that we get for σ = − 1 the quadratic utility function used above. 
The assumption of s > 0 guarantees that v′(0) is finite. The elasticity of substitution 
equals c/(c/σ + s) which is monotonically increasing in c.
To make things as simple as possible, we will consider an asymmetric equilib-
rium with full employment in the formal sector. The generalized Stone-Geary with 
σ < 1 and negative consumption requirement satisfies this property, for example.
Denote by  x​E and  x​M consumption of mass and exclusive goods, respectively. 
Instead of the price of mass consumption goods, we now normalize marginal costs 
w/g = 1 and get the following Lerner indices
(C1)   p​E − 1 _​​p​E   =  
 x​E (1 − β)​​__​​​x​E (1 − β)/σ + s  
and
(C2)   p​M − 1 _​​p​M   =  
 x​M  _​​x​M /σ + s  .
The profit arbitrage condition is given by
(C3)  ( p​M − 1) x​M =  ( p​E − 1) x​E .
For simplicity, we consider a full employment equilibrium, hence the aggregate 
resource constraint reads
(C4) n x​M + (1 − n)​x​E = 1.
Now, consider a rise in inequality. In a unique equilibrium, more inequality leads 
to more exclusion, i.e., a decrease in n. Assume to the contrary that  p​E falls. By 
(C1),  x​E must also decrease. (C3) then implies that ( p​M − 1)​x​M falls. From (C2) 
we know, however, that  p​M and  x​M are positively related. Therefore, both  p​M and 
x​M must decrease. Taken together n x​M + (1 − n)​x​E must fall (recall that  x​M >  x​E ). 
But this contradicts the aggregate resource constraint (C4). Hence, we conclude  p​E 
must increase. By the same reasoning,  x​E, and therefore  p​M and  x​M, must increase. 
Thus, markups rise.
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